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The Nazis were able to capitalize on this authoritarian conception, just as they were able to
play on the differences between the more conventionally authoritarian and scientific supporters
of racial hygiene and the radical anti-Semites and racists. Just as Weindling provides a more
complex understanding of the German Sonderweg, so he demonstrates that the most extreme
Nazi measures of forced sterilization, euthanasia, and mass murder cannot be comprehended
from simple "intentionalist" or "functionalist" perspectives, but rather in terms of the
interaction between the actions taken by doctors, scientists and lower-level Nazis, on the one
hand, and thewill anddecisions ofHitlerand histopleaders, ontheother. Thus, whiletherewere
severe tensions between many doctors and scientists and the regime, medicine was nevertheless
"integral to the final solution", (p. 552) and the traditions of German genetics, scientific
professionalism as it had developed in that country, and a goodly amount ofpersonal ambition
and opportunism had promoted this involvement. Real science could go on, as the genetic
studies of Otmar von Verschuer and even his infamous student, Josef Mengele, demonstrate.
Verschuer, whowas rehabilitated afterthe war,joined othercolleagues in arguing that they were
true scientists victimized byradical Nazis. Weindling demonstrates in this fine book that this was
notonly aspecious argument in termsoftheirpersonal histories, but even more importantly that
it was precisely the authoritarian professionalism and pretentious claims of such "true
scientists", as they had developed since the nineteenth century, that were the problem.
Gerald D. Feldman, University of California, Berkeley
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The history ofEnglish eugenics has been blessed with a mass offine scholarship over the last
decade, perhaps not surprisingly. Today's developments in genetic engineering keep the subject
controversial; moreover, the Eugenics Society's papers form a fascinating collection easily
accessible at the Wellcome Institute Contemporary Medical Archives Centre. Earlier work by
Lyndsay Farrall, Geoffrey Searle, and Greta Jones was capped in 1985 by Daniel J. Kevles's
comprehensive In the name ofeugenics. Genetics andthe uses ofhuman heredity. Was there scope
for another general account?
Readers of Richard Soloway's characteristically fluent and subtle survey will probably
conclude that there was. There is much in his account that casts doubt on Greta Jones's claim
that eugenics became a powerful weapon in ruling-class politics from the Edwardian age
onwards. Reaffirming what is generally becoming the authorized version, Soloway
demonstrates that eugenics failed to generate a truly wide appeal. The membership of the
Eugenics Education Society (later, the Eugenics Society) was barely two thousand. Ofthese, the
active and vocal core included few major public figures, scientists or politicians: the Society's
long-serving leader, Leonard Darwin (who thought eugenics good common sense, rather like
stock-breeding), always fought a losing battle in trying to convince such front-rank scientists as
Karl Pearson and Ronald Fisher, whilejousting with unwanted allies like Marie Stopes (target
ofa notablyjaundiced portrait from Soloway), and trying to placate the "better dead" brigade
amongst the membership.
Long before the rise ofthe Nazis, eugenics was too hot a potato to stand much prospect of
incorporation into the programme of any political party or church. No less concerned by
"national deterioration" than the eugenists, public health spokesmen looked instead to
environmental and social improvementsasthewayforward; and the medical profession chose to
keepasquietabouteugenicsasaboutallotheraspectsofthatembarrassing subject, sex. In short,
so Soloway convincingly demonstrates, quite apart from its shortcomings as science, eugenics
wasmaladroit asamovement, a pressuregroup uncertain and divided as to what it wastrying to
achieve.
Was it worth another book? Does Soloway significantly modify the received view? Yes,
because, in great detail and with surer steps than previous scholars, Soloway traces the ripples of
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eugenics from the 1930s (by which time it had effectively lost steam as a campaign) to the age of
the Pill and legalized abortion. He traces the highjacking ofthe cause by younger researchers,
above all, David Glass, who used its good offices, and its funds, for social science investigation
into demographic problems. By demonstrating that, with an ageing workforce, Britain's
problem was likely to beunder- ratherthan over-population, Glass, EversleyandTitmussmined
the basic premisses of the movement.
Soloway also elegantly suggests that the British refuted the need for "eugenics", in their
bedrooms. They stood by the nuclear family, took to contraception, and reliably produced 2.4
children per couple. With growing prosperity, they were visibly healthier than the "unfit"
specimens over whom early eugenists had fretted.
Eugenics has now been comprehensively surveyed by Kevles and Soloway. To prevent
overpopulation, responsible scholars should now exercise voluntary restraint.
Roy Porter, Wellcome Institute
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Anyone who knows Honisgbaum's book on The division in British medicine is already familiar
with his thorough scholarship. His new volume dealing with the role of civil servants in the
creation of the National Health Service is yet another example of his careful research and
analysis.
Honisgbaum chronicles a battle from 1936 to 1948 between two opposing factions whose
ideologies stemmed from different social standpoints. The most significant theme in his story is
the influence of the British social class system lurking behind all negotiations surrounding the
NHS. On one side there were Oxbridge-educated, distinctly upper-class civil servants imbued
with the highest ideals of service and noblesse oblige. On the other was the general-practitioner
stratum ofthe medical profession, whose history ofcommercial competition had turned them, in
the eyes ofthe civil servants at least, into tradesmen. The chiefcivil servants, above all Sir John
Maude, the permanent secretary at the Ministry ofHealth from 1941 to 1945, were horrified by
this degradation ofwhat should have been the most noble of professions and sought to elevate
doctors to gentlemen by making them salaried employees in a government service. General
practitioners, however, protected theireconomic and occupational independence morejealously
than anything else and believed they had witnessed its diminution, first by club practice, and
later, most seriously, by the introduction of National Insurance in 1911.
Municipal administration of the system was logical to tidy-minded civil servants. To GPs,
however, who hated the sight ofMedical Officers ofHealth for encroaching upon their territory
and stealing their business with their municipal child and maternity clinics, it was an anathema.
The aloofMaude was surrounded by "yes-men" within his department and those who did try to
communicate the mood of the profession to him, like the C.M.O. Sir William Jameson and
Charles Hill, the president of the BMA, were either ignored or despised. The strategy of the
profession was to move the battle-ground to institutions outside the Ministry, such as the BMA's
representative committee. They succeeded in sending the planning process into a state of
disarray until Maude's successor at the Ministry, Sir Henry Willink, conceded almost all of the
doctors' demands.
Perhaps the most interesting portrait amongst many here is that of Aneurin Bevan.
Honigsbaum describes Bevan's acute political judgement as a mixture of pragmatic flexibility,
creative genius, and Machiavellian cunning, which brought the government back from the brink
of total surrender to the medical profession in 1945. The Labour radical kept socialism in his
back pocket while he played offthe aims ofLord Moran's consultant service against those ofthe
GPs, offering sticks and carrots to bring the profession into the scheme. According to
Honigsbaum, Bevan's trump card was the nationalization of the hospital service, which
eliminated the ferocious battle over municipalization overnight. The profession coalesced, the
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